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This Essay examines how law can help to control financial chaos.
To that end, regulation should strive to not only maximize economic
efficiency within the financial system but also protect the financial system
itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these goals, however, will
be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Increasing financial complexity has created
information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, whereas lawimposed standardization would have its own flaws. Bounded human
rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise ideal laws.
Furthermore, the increasing dispersion of financial risk is undermining
monitoring incentives. We also do not yet fully understand how systemic
risk is triggered and spread. Because regulation therefore cannot prevent
systemic shocks, regulation should also operate to reduce systemic
consequences by stabilizing parts of the financial system afflicted by those
shocks.
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INTRODUCTION
How can the law help to control financial chaos? By financial
chaos, I mean the failure of a chain of financial markets or financial
firms, or a chain of significant losses to financial firms, that results in
increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability.1 The risk
that financial chaos will occur is often referred to as systemic risk.2
Many regulatory responses to systemic risk, like the Dodd-Frank
Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated
reactions to the 2008 financial crisis,3 looking for villains (whether or
not they exist).4 To be most effective, however, the regulation must be
situated within a more analytical framework.
To create such a framework, we first need to consider what the
scope of systemic risk regulation should be. There has been a great deal
of regulatory focus on banks and other financial firms. Some of this is
path dependent: historically, a chain of bank failures remains an
important symbol of systemic risk. The media and politicians also have
focused on financial firms because they are so visible and their
problems have been so dramatic.
But we also need to recognize that the ongoing trend towards
disintermediation—enabling companies to directly access the ultimate
source of funds, the capital markets, without going through financial
1.
Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008)
(defining systemic risk in these terms).
2.
Id.
3.
Another dimension of this problem is that politicians have short-term
reelection goals whereas good regulatory solutions are often long-term. Cf. Edward J.
Kane, The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking 12 (Mar. 6, 2012) (draft on file with
author) (“Because regulators have relatively short terms in office, they are attracted to
temporary, rather than lasting[,] fixes.”).
4.
The Dodd-Frank Act delegates much of the regulatory details to
administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies
engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial
Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential
systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1394–98
(2010). The Council will be aided in this task by a newly created and, hopefully,
nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. Id. Regulators therefore will have the ability
to look beyond the Act’s confines.

2012:815

Controlling Financial Chaos

817

intermediaries—is making financial markets themselves increasingly
central to any examination of systemic risk.5
For example, although the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008
filled the headlines, its trigger was the collapse of the market for
mortgage-backed securities. Many of these securities were
collateralized in part by risky subprime home mortgages, which were
expected to be refinanced through home appreciation. When home
prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers could not refinance. In many
cases, they defaulted. These defaults caused substantial amounts of
investment-grade-rated mortgage-backed securities to be downgraded
and, in some cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in
these and other rated securities, and their market prices started falling.
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed
securities, was particularly exposed. Lehman’s counterparties began
demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not provide.
Absent a government bailout, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. That, in
turn, caused securities markets to panic; even the short-term
commercial paper market virtually shut down, and the market prices of
mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic
value of the mortgage loans backing those securities.6 That accelerated
the death spiral, causing financial firms holding mortgage-backed
securities to appear, if not be, more financially risky; requiring highly
leveraged firms to engage in fire-sales of assets (thereby exacerbating
the fall in prices); and shutting off credit markets, which impacted the
real economy.
This demonstrates that both financial firms and financial markets
can, if they fail, be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. The
scope of any regulatory framework for managing systemic risk should
therefore include both financial firms and markets.
Before attempting to design such a regulatory framework, we need
to examine what the framework’s goals should be. The primary goal for
regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic
efficiency within the financial system. Systemic risk is a form of
financial risk, so efficiency should certainly be a goal in its regulation.
But systemic risk also represents risk to the financial system itself. Any

5.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 200.
6.
Even prior to Lehman’s collapse, mortgage-backed securities may have
been undervalued in the market. For example, in July 2008 I was an expert in the Orion
Finance SIV case in the English High Court of Justice. Orion’s mortgage-backed
securities had a market value of around twenty-two cents on the dollar, whereas the
present value of its reasonably expected cash flows was around eighty-eight cents on the
dollar because most of the mortgages were prime.
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framework for regulating systemic risk therefore should also include
that macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial system itself.7
I. MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
Financial regulation can help to maximize economic efficiency by
correcting market failures. As discussed below, at least four types of
partly interrelated market failures occur within the financial system:
information failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and
incentive failure.

A. Correcting Information Failure
Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure.8
Financial markets and products are already incredibly complex, and
that complexity is certain to increase. Profit opportunities are inherent
in complexity, due in part to investor demand for securities that more
precisely match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage
increases complexity as market participants take advantage of
inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national borders.
And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to financial
products but also to financial markets.9
Complexity has been undermining disclosure, which has been the
chief regulatory response to financial information failure.10 Although
most, if not all, of the risks on complex mortgage-backed securities
were disclosed prior to the 2008 financial crisis, many institutional

7.
For a critical discussion of the rationale of financial regulation, see
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE
ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS (forthcoming 2012).
8.
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial
Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009). Information failure can arise from other
causes as well, including the potential for transaction costs relating to information
acquisition to diminish the value of new information (and thus the incentive to acquire
such information). See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility
of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
9.
I have argued that there are two aspects to complexity: cognitive
complexity, meaning that things are too complicated and non-linear to understand; and
temporal complexity, meaning that systems work too quickly and interactively to
control. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 214–15. Engineers sometimes refer to temporal
complexity as tight coupling. Id.
10.
See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209–35 (1999)
(discussing the general purpose of disclosure in the Exchange Act and the Securities
Act).
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investors—including even the largest, most sophisticated firms—bought
these securities without fully understanding them.11
The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving
disclosure,12 but its efficacy will be limited. Some financial structures
are getting so complex that they are incomprehensible.13 Furthermore,
it may well be rational for an investor to invest in high-yielding
complex securities without fully understanding them. Among other
reasons,14 the investor simply may not have the staffing to evaluate the
securities, whereas failure to invest would appear to—and in fact
could—competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis others who invest.
This begs the question whether institutional investors will hire
experts as needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests
they do not always do so, and theory explains why. Although experts
may be hired to the extent that their costs do not exceed the benefits
gained from more fully understanding the complexity, at some level of
complexity those costs will exceed—or at least appear to exceed—any
potential gain. This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible,
whereas the benefit gained from fully understanding complex
transactions is intangible and harder to quantify—especially since
constantly innovating markets cause rapid informational obsolescence.
Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may well give greater
weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible benefit.

11.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110; cf. John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A
Review of Recent Derivatives Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 74
(2011) (observing that court records reveal investors’ misunderstandings about the
nature of derivative financial instruments).
12.
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118–20 (2010) (requiring additional
disclosure); § 942(b) (requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose
information on the assets backing each tranche of security); § 945 (requiring the SEC to
issue rules requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose the nature of the
underlying assets); § 951 (requiring persons who make solicitations for the sale of all or
substantially all of a corporation’s assets to disclose their compensation arrangements to
shareholders).
13.
See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, Did We Make Things Too Complicated?,
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2008, at 24; David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships
Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C1 (“[O]ne industry giant, the El Paso
Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals [using off-balance sheet
partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible.”). It
appears hyperbolic to say that structures created by humans cannot be understood by
humans. The larger problem may be that relatively few people can understand the
structures and that many structures may not be able to be understood by any single
person.
14.
For a comprehensive review of these reasons, see Schwarcz, supra note
11, at 1113–15.
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“The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the
more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of
equilibrium.”15
Information failure not only undermines investor disclosure. It also
undermines the ability of regulators themselves to keep up with the
financial industry, and indeed regulators have extreme difficulty
keeping up with financial innovation.16
A possible way to address information failure resulting from
complexity would be to require investments and other financial
products to become more standardized. One of the goals of the DoddFrank Act, for example, is to standardize more derivatives transactions.
To this end, the Act requires many derivatives to be cleared through
clearinghouses,17 which generally require a high degree of
standardization in the derivatives they clear.18
But standardization can backfire. Dodd-Frank’s clearinghouse
requirement might inadvertently increase systemic risk by concentrating
derivatives exposure at the clearinghouse level.19 And the overall
economic impact of standardization is unclear because standardization
can stifle innovation and interfere with the ability of parties to achieve
the efficiencies that arise when firms craft financial products tailored to
the particular needs and risk preferences of investors.
Dodd-Frank also attempts to address information failure by
requiring sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum
unhedged position in each class of securities they sell—the so-called
“skin in the game.”20 This too can backfire. By retaining residual risk
portions of certain complex securitization products they were selling,
underwriters may actually have fostered false investor confidence,
contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. Complexity, in other words,

Id. at 1114.
See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of
Modern Financial Markets 37–51 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 49/2011,
2011), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1916649 (discussing the relationship
15.
16.

between complexity and financial innovation in the regulation of OTC derivatives).
17.
Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a).
18.
This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an
exception for derivatives that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. § 723(a)(3).
19.
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1395 (2011)
(“Central clearing merely shifts counterparty risk to a clearinghouse, reducing that risk
only to the extent that clearinghouses can manage risk better or are more creditworthy
than individual firms.”).
20.
See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 941(b), § 15G (directing the SEC to require
sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the
underlying assets).
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can cause not only information asymmetry but also mutual
misinformation.21
In a world of complexity, disclosure will not always be sufficient
to correct information failure. Moreover, even perfect disclosure would
be insufficient to mitigate information failures that cause systemic risk.
Individual market participants who fully understand the risk will be
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the financial system
as a whole. A market participant may well decide to engage in a
profitable transaction even though doing so could increase systemic
risk, since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would
be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary
citizens impacted by an economic collapse.22
There are, therefore, no complete solutions to the problem of
financial information failure.

B. Correcting Rationality Failure
Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality—a
type of information failure, but one distinct and important enough to
merit a separate category. Investors are complacent, following the herd
in their investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, such as
rating-agency ratings.23 Market participants are also prone to panic.24
Furthermore, due to optimism bias and availability bias, they are
unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with
21.
See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 241–42 (discussing mutual
misinformation).
22.
See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206 (explaining this concept and describing
it as a type of “tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons insofar as
market participants suffer from the actions of other market participants; it is a more
standard externality insofar as non-market participants suffer from the actions of market
participants.
23.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83, 404–05 (2008).
24.
For a thoughtful analysis of how rationality failures help to explain the
2008 financial crisis, see Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard:
How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010). One of the causes of the financial crisis may
have been intellectual hazard, “the tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with
accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations.” Id. at 808. Some
examples of behavioral biases include complexity bias, the tendency to analyze a
situation wrongly because of inadequate ability to interpret complex information;
incentive bias, the tendency “to see the world in accordance with their [own] selfinterest”; and asymmetry bias, the tendency to rely on “pre-formed and fixed ideas,
judgments, or attitudes.” Id. at 813–18. During the financial crisis, actors in complex
organizations enabled the spread of systemic risk by failing to properly acquire,
process, transmit, and implement key risk-related information. Id. at 810.
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which they have no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and
potential consequences of those events.25
Thus, during periods of relative economic stability—such as during
the decade before the financial crisis—market participants may underassess the risk of low-probability adverse market events. They may also
underestimate seemingly mundane low-probability events. For example,
their very familiarity with collateral may have led members of the
financial community to underestimate the likelihood and potential
consequences of a drop in housing prices. The impact of that drop on
collateral value changed, in some cases, what was thought to be
overcollateralized (and therefore protected) mortgage-backed securities
into under-secured (and therefore insufficiently protected) securities.26
Dodd-Frank attempts to fix a sliver of this problem by attempting
to improve rating-agency ratings.27 But the greater regulatory hurdle is
that human nature cannot be easily changed. It is unclear—and DoddFrank does not address—how complacency, for example, can be
remedied. And although panics are often the triggers that commence a
chain of systemic failures, it is impossible to identify all the causes of
panics that can trigger systemic risk.

C. Correcting Principal-Agent Failure
Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from conflicts of
interest between managers and owners of firms. The Dodd-Frank Act
attempts to fix this traditional type of conflict. It ignores, however, a
much more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of
secondary-management conflicts.28 The nub of the problem is that
secondary managers are almost always paid under short-term
compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term
interests of the firm.29
Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and
the senior managers to whom they report. For example, as the VaR, or
value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became
more accepted, financial firms began compensating secondary managers
not only for generating profits but also for generating profits with low

25.
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1366–67.
26.
Id. at 1367–68.
27.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, secs. 931–939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–90 (2010).
28.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem
of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009).
29.
Id. at 460.
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risks, as measured by VaR.30 Secondary managers turned to investment
products with low VaR risk profile, like credit-defaults swaps that
generate small gains but only rarely have losses. They knew, but did
not always explain to their superiors, that any losses that might
eventually occur would be huge.
In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term
compensation schemes (e.g., compensation subject to clawbacks or
deferred compensation based on long-term results).31 In practice,
however, that solution would confront a collective action problem:
firms that offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation
might not be able to hire as competitively as firms that offer more
immediate compensation.32 Regulation may be needed to help solve this
collective action problem not only within nations but also across
nations,33 because good secondary managers can work in financial
centers worldwide.

D. Correcting Incentive Failure
Risk dispersion can create benefits, such as investment
diversification and more efficient allocation of risk. But risk can be
marginalized, becoming “so widely dispersed that rational market
participants individually lack the incentive to monitor it.”34 This

30.
See, e.g., PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR
MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 568 (3d ed. 2007).
31.
It appears that at least two financial firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, are beginning to implement this type of compensation policy. See Liz Moyer,
On ‘Bleak’ Street, Bosses in Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2012, at C1 (reporting
that these firms “would seek to recover pay from any employee whose actions expose
the firms to substantial financial or legal repercussions”).
32.
See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 127, 157–58 (2009) (arguing that financial firms have had trouble balancing the
discouragement of excessive risk-taking against the need to create profit-maximizing
incentives and preferences).
33.
The Basel Capital Accords exemplify global rules intended to help avoid
prejudicing the competitiveness of firms—in this case, banks—in any given nation or
region. See, e.g., Clyde Stoltenberg et al., The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in

the U.S. and EU Capital Market Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests toward
International Harmonization with Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
577, 615–44 (2011) (examining U.S. and E.U. efforts to adopt harmonized financial
standards); Arie C. Eernisse, Note, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in
Improving the International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239,
254–56 (2012) (discussing the Basel III capital and liquidity framework and its
emphasis on consistent global standards).
34.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487,
517 (2012).
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problem is not unlike the tragedy of the anticommons in property law;
where too many owners have rights to exclude others from a scarce
resource, no individual owner has an effective privilege of use and the
resource becomes prone to underuse.35 In a financial market context,
where too many owners (e.g., investors) have rights in a scarce
resource (a class of securities), no single investor will have a sufficient
amount at risk to individually motivate monitoring. Undermonitoring
caused by this incentive failure appears to have contributed, at least in
part, to the 2008 financial crisis.36
The problem of incentive failure is difficult to solve. Although
regulation could require—perhaps for certain large issuances of
complex securities—that a minimum unhedged position be held by a
single sophisticated investor in each class of securities,37 regulatory
attempts to limit risk dispersion would have tradeoffs: increasing the
potential for regulatory arbitrage, impairing the ability of parties to
achieve negotiated market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing
financial instability.38
35.
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). The tragedy of
the anticommons is not a perfect analogy because it occurs when too many owners have
the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, whereas marginalization of risk (and
its resulting undermonitoring) does not necessarily involve excluding others. Perhaps a
more apt analogy for undermonitoring caused by marginalization of risk is the
collective action problem of “rational apathy.” See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Taking
Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 622–25 (2007) (discussing
that problem).
36.
Cf. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Central Bank, Speech at the
Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference: Undervalued Risk and Uncertainty: Some
Thoughts on the Market Turmoil (Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://www.ecb.int/
press/key/date/2008/html/sp081113_1.en.html (“The root cause of the [financial] crisis
was the overall and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial institutions
and countries.”); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § MM
(Magazine), at 24.
37.
For a discussion of this type of regulation, see Schwarcz, supra note 34, at
27–28. Securitization sellers are required by the Dodd-Frank Act to keep “skin in the
game” by retaining risk in the form of at least a five percent unhedged vertical slice of
risk. Problematically, such retention would only mitigate conflicts between the parties
retaining and those taking on the risk, not between financial market participants and the
non-financial market participants who bear the burden of externalized risk in a systemic
collapse of the financial system. Id. at 28 n.136; cf. Kevin Villani, Risk-Retention
Rules Set Up the Private Investor for Failure, AM. BANKER (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:06 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/QRM-qualifying-residential-mortgage-riskretention-housing-private-investor-1041645-1.html (arguing that lack of “skin in the
game” was not responsible for financial firms’ “astronomical leverage”).
38.
Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 35. Risk dispersion can create benefits such
as reducing the asymmetry in market information and more efficiently allocating risks.
This is accomplished by shifting risk on financial assets to investors and other market
participants who are better able to assess risk. Risk dispersion can, however, also
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E. Summary
The first goal of any regulatory framework for managing systemic
risk is maximizing economic efficiency within the financial system, and
there are at least four types of market failures that impair efficiency.
Information failure is primarily caused by complexity, for which there
are no perfect solutions. Rationality failure is difficult, if not virtually
impossible, to correct because human nature cannot be easily changed.
Principal-agent failure can theoretically be addressed by paying
managers—including
secondary
managers—under
longer-term
compensation schemes; but in practice that solution must overcome
collective action problems, both within and across national borders.
And the problem of incentive failure has only second-best solutions.
Regulation therefore cannot completely prevent market failures within
the financial system.39
Next consider the second goal of any regulatory framework for
managing systemic risk—protecting the financial system itself. In that
context, I will show, among other things, that uncorrected market
failures not only can impair efficiency within the financial system but
also can contribute to a breakdown of the financial system.
II. PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ITSELF
There are at least three ways that regulation could protect the
financial system itself. First, regulation could attempt to limit the
triggers of systemic risk. Second, regulation could attempt to limit the
transmission of systemic shocks. Third, regulation could attempt to
stabilize the financial system when afflicted by systemic shocks.

create market failures that cause market participants to misjudge or ignore potential
correlations. A prime example is investors’ mistaken belief that asset-backed securities
provided an investment market that was uncorrelated with traditional debt markets. To
investors’ surprise, when ABS investments backed by subprime mortgage loans began
defaulting, so did other ABS investments backed by other types of assets. Id. at 7–11,
35.
39.
In other contexts, I have summarized these market failures more
intuitively as the “3Cs” of complexity, conflicts, and complacency—complexity
corresponding to information failure and incentive failure; conflicts corresponding to
principal-agent failure; and complacency corresponding to rationality failure. Steven L.
Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, Keynote Address at the South
Carolina Law Review Symposium: 1.9 Kids and a Foreclosure: Subprime Mortgages,
the Credit Crisis, and Restoring the American Dream (Oct. 24, 2008), in 60 S.C. L.
REV. 549, 561–64 (2009) (suggesting the 3Cs categorization). Combined with the
tragedy of the commons, these failures collectively can be referred to as the 3Cs and
the TOC. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 204, 206.
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A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Risk

Ideal regulation would act ex ante, eliminating the triggers of
systemic risk.40 Realistically, however, we cannot eliminate those
triggers. As mentioned, although panics are often the triggers that
commence a chain of systemic failures, it is impossible even to identify
all the causes of panics.
To some extent also, the market failures discussed41 could trigger
panics or other systemic shocks. For example, information failure,
principal-agent failure, and incentive failure could, individually or in
combination, cause one or more large firms to overinvest, leading to
bankruptcy; and rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a
large financial market to collapse. As shown, these market failures
cannot be completely corrected.
Furthermore, market realities can increase the magnitude of these
shocks. For example, credit markets often provide short-term funding
of long-term capital needs because the interest rate on short-term debt is
usually lower than that on long-term debt.42 This can create the
financial market equivalent of bank runs if, due to investor anxiety,
firms are unable to roll over, or refinance, their short-term debt.43

40.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial
Regulation, Keynote Address at the 2011 Chapman Law Review Symposium “From
Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of Financial Regulation” (Jan. 28, 2011), in 15
CHAP. L. REV. 257, 258 (2011) (“Once a failure occurs, there may already be
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and
becoming systemic.”).
41.
See supra Part I.
42.
Short-term debt is less risky—and therefore bears a lower interest rate—
than long-term debt, other things being equal, because it is easier to assess an obligor’s
ability to repay in the short term than in the long term.
43.
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick argue, for example, that the precipitous
2008 decline in value of mortgage-backed securities used as collateral for short-term
repo loans prompted repo lenders to demand additional collateral. Gary Gorton &
Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 15–16 (Oct. 18, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947. They
contend that these demands approximated bank runs—in which panicked depositors
withdraw funds from their banks—to the extent bank repo-borrowers were forced to sell
assets to generate the additional collateral. Id. at 15. They also argue that these
demands were caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of different borrowers to
the flagging real estate market and the value of borrowers’ collateral in the event of
defaults. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,
J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with the Wisconsin Law
Review). Insofar as that opacity resulted from complexity, Gordon and Metrick’s
argument supports my observation that complexity, one of the four market failures
discussed, can trigger panics or other systemic shocks.

2012:815

Controlling Financial Chaos

827

It is inevitable, therefore, that the financial system will face
systemic shocks from time to time. Consider next how to limit the
transmission of these shocks.

B. Limiting the Transmission of Systemic Shocks
Second-best regulation could act ex post, after a systemic shock is
triggered, by limiting the transmission of the shock (i.e., limiting its
contagion). This approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which
holds that in complex engineering systems—and, I have argued, also in
complex financial systems—failures are almost inevitable.44 Therefore
remedies should focus on breaking the transmission of these failures.45
To break the transmission of systemic failures would require that
the transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It probably is not
feasible, though, to identify all those mechanisms in advance.
Nonetheless, based on a study of four financial crises in the past
century, Professor Iman Anabtawi of UCLA and I have attempted to
describe at least one such transmission mechanism.46
We argue that “two otherwise independent correlations can
combine to transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic
crises. The first is an intra-firm correlation between a firm’s financial
integrity and its exposure to risk from low-probability adverse events
that either constitute or could lead to economic shocks.”47 The second is
a system-wide correlation among financial firms and markets.
The 2008 financial crisis, for example, almost certainly was
caused, or at least made worse, by the two correlations working in
combination. Subprime mortgage loans were bundled together as
collateral to partially support the payment of complex mortgage-backed
securities that were sold to banks and other financial firms worldwide.48
44.
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 248–49. One aspect of chaos theory is
deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the
system, the more likely it is that failures will occur. Thus, the most successful
(complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. In
engineering design, for example, this can be done by decoupling systems through
modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will
systemically trigger a failure in another part. Id. at 248.
45.
Id. at 248–49.
46.
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19.
47.
Id. at 1351 (footnote omitted).
48.
To some extent, the U.S. government itself pressured banks and other
mortgage lenders to make and securitize subprime mortgage loans, in order to expand
homeownership. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON, THE LOST CAUSE: THE FAILURE OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/
2011/02/10/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf. Misguided government policy can certainly contribute
to systemic risk. See, e.g., E-mail from Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor
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When home prices began falling, some of these mortgage-backed
securities began defaulting, requiring financial firms heavily invested in
these securities to write down their value, causing these firms to
appear, if not be, more financially risky.49 This represented a failure of
these firms to see, or at least to fully appreciate, the intra-firm
correlation between low-probability risk—in this case, the risk that
home prices would significantly fall—and firm integrity.50
The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide
correlations—not only the tight interconnectedness among banks and
non-bank financial firms but also the tight interconnectedness between
financial firms and markets.51 What made the financial crisis so
devastating was that these failures combined to facilitate the
transmission of economic shocks.
Regulation should try to increase awareness of these types of
correlations and limit their potential to combine. Professor Anabtawi
and I have shown, however, that the same types of market failures that
impair efficiency—which, this Essay has just demonstrated, cannot be
completely prevented by regulation52—make it unlikely that financial
market participants will use sufficient effort to either identify the
correlations or attempt to prevent their combining.53 Furthermore, we
of Fin. Insts., Columbia Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., to the author (Oct. 13, 2011) (on
file with the author) (“Government policy is the main contributor to systemic risk, not
just in the recent crisis, but more generally . . . .”).
49.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50.
The problem of assessing the risk of low-probability adverse events is
especially acute during periods in which there have been no major adverse economic
shocks. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1367.
[R]ecent stability will allay fears of adverse occurrences. Market
participants may begin to view the data as following a normal distribution,
in which observations that deviate dramatically from the mean lie in the
distribution’s thin tails. In reality, however, the data may come from a
distribution of outcomes with higher kurtosis, or “fat tails,” so that the true
risk of extreme events is far greater than it is under a normal distribution.
Alternatively, decisionmakers may underestimate low-probability events
because of their mundaneness. Unusual events, such as a large meteor
hitting the earth, are highly salient. In contrast, mundane events, such as
changes in collateral value, are commonplace, possibly existing on a
continuum. The familiarity with collateral of individuals working in the
financial sector might have led them to underestimate the potential
consequences of a drop in collateral prices.
Id. at 1367–68 (footnotes omitted).
51.
The tight interconnectedness described above also can have a temporal
component insofar as the connections, being interactive, work too quickly to control.
See supra note 9.
52.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
53.
Information and incentive failure, for example, can cause failures to
identify or fully appreciate both correlations: between low-probability risk and firm
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have identified only one of potentially many transmission mechanisms
for systemic failure.54 We therefore need to turn to ways to stabilize the
financial system that go beyond limiting the transmission of systemic
shocks.

C. Stabilizing the Afflicted Financial System
Regulation could also work ex post even after a systemic shock has
been triggered and is being transmitted. The regulation would then
attempt to stabilize the afflicted financial system. This could be done by
trying to stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets
impacted by the transmission.55 This approach again takes inspiration
from chaos theory, insofar as that theory holds that remedies should
also focus on limiting the consequences of failures.56
There are at least two ways that regulation could stabilize
systemically important firms and financial markets: by ensuring
liquidity to those firms and markets, and by requiring those firms and
markets to be more internally robust.
1. ENSURING LIQUIDITY TO FIRMS AND MARKETS
Liquidity has traditionally been used, especially by government
central banks, to help prevent financial firms from defaulting. The U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank, for example, has had this role of lender of last
resort to banks,57 and the European Commission is in the process of
attempting to help recapitalize European banks that are exposed to
sovereign-debt risk.
Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms would
follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least
be partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk

integrity, and among financial firms and markets. Rationality failure can also foster
failures to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk
and firm integrity. And principal-agent failure can result in a failure to identify or fully
appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk and firm integrity. See
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1363–70.
54.
Cf. supra note 48 (noting that misguided government policy can contribute
to systemic risk). Being driven by short-term political decisions and other noneconomic factors, government policy will always be a risk factor.
55.
To the extent regulation stabilizes a systemically important firm that
otherwise would be failing due to endogenous or non-systemic exogenous causes, the
regulation could also be viewed as an ex ante solution.
56.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6 § 13(3), 38 Stat. 263, 263–64
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)).
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fund.58 There is strong precedent for requiring the private sector to
contribute to funds that would help to internalize externalities. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, requires member
banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to ensure that
depositors of failed banks are repaid.59 In the nuclear industry, the
Price-Anderson Act requires a first-tier funding of $375 million by each
owner of a nuclear reactor to compensate for possible reactor accidents.
The Act also requires an $11.6 billion self-insurance fund, funded
collectively by all owners of nuclear reactors.60
In the systemic risk context, privatizing the source of liquidity
would likewise help to internalize externalities by addressing the
dilemma that market participants are economically motivated to create
externalities that could have systemic consequences.61 Privatization
would not only offset the cost to taxpayers of liquidity advances that are
not repaid but also, if structured appropriately,62 should discourage
fund contributors—including those that believe they are “too big to
fail”—from engaging in financially risky activities.

58.
Although it is possible that the financial industry itself might voluntarily
create and contribute to such a fund, I believe that is highly unlikely. Because systemic
financial externalities are imposed on parties outside the financial industry, the
industry, qua industry, would not necessarily have an incentive to do that. See supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if there were incentive, the
financial industry may be too fragmented and heterogeneous to efficiently selfcoordinate. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward
Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 420 (2011) (observing
“regulatory fragmentation and heterogeneity of interests throughout the [financial]
industry” as well as “the lack of a ‘community of fate’ mentality”).
59.
See infra note 62.
60.
Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, U.S.NRC,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html (last updated
June 9, 2011).
61.
Cf. supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
62.
For example, required contributions could be sized as a function, among
other factors, of the contributor’s financially risky activities. This Essay does not,
however, purport to set formulas for required contributions, other than observing that
there is precedent for sizing required private sector contributions on risk. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, assesses risk-based premiums on its
member banks. Capital Groups and Supervisory Groups, FDIC, http://
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html (last updated July 13, 2007)
(stating that member banks are assessed based on the risk they pose to the Deposit
Insurance Fund). Assessment rates for member banks in 2011 ranged from 2.5 cents to
45 cents on every $100 of assessable deposits. Deposit Insurance Assessments, FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/proposed.html (last updated May
24, 2011). For more information on FDIC assessments, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (2011),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/20005000.html#fdic2000part327.10.
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Perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act undercuts liquidity by sharply
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to
individual or insolvent financial firms.63 That categorical limitation
appears somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort
can be an important safeguard if it acts judiciously. Even more
perversely, the idea of a systemic risk fund was originally included in
the bill that would become the Dodd-Frank Act but was taken out
before enactment because of opposition by politicians who believed that
the fund would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.64 I
believe that belief is misguided. The likelihood that systemically
important firms will have to make additional contributions to the fund
to replenish bailout monies should motivate those firms to monitor each
other and help control each other’s risky behavior.65 Because their own
funds would be at risk, for example, fund contributors would have
incentives to inform regulators when other firms take unwise risks.66 If
the required contributions to the fund are risk-adjusted, fund
contributors would also have incentives to report firms that are
underpaying.67
The European Commission apparently has been considering the
idea of a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the
financial sector.68 Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is
currently unresolved,69 news reports indicate that an originally

63.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–15 (2010).
64.
See S. Amendment 3827, 111th Cong. (2010), 156 CONG. REC. S3223
(daily ed. May 5, 2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a
tax on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies); Edward Wyatt &
David M Herzenhorn, Bill Drops Fund to Shut Failed Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2010, at B1.
65.
Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 27–28.
66.
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:
Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28
YALE J. ON REG. 151, 156 (2011) (calling for a systemic emergency insurance fund that
is funded by the financial industry).
67.
Id.
68.
Taxation of the Financial Sector, COM (2010) 549 final (Oct. 7, 2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/
com_2010_0549_en.pdf; see also Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common
System of Financial Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC COM (2011) 594 final
(Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Council Directive], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/com(2011)
594_en.pdf.
69.
Council Directive, supra note 68, at 3 (indicating that one of the possible
uses of the tax would be to provide a source of funds for the EU).
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contemplated use was a systemic risk fund.70 The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) also appears to be using the European
Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes on
banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial
meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.”71 Ideally, any tax on the
financial sector should be global to avoid prejudicing the
competitiveness of firms located in particular taxing jurisdictions.72
Besides stabilizing systemically important firms, it is important to
remember that financial markets, too, can be triggers and transmitters
of systemic risk. Liquidity can also be used to stabilize systemically
important financial markets.73 For example, in response to the postLehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve
created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to act as a
lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing
“temporary liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from
highly rated issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper.74 The
CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.75
This is different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank
purchases securities as a form of monetary policy.76 The task of a
70.
Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down
Banks that Go Bust, EUR. COMMISSION (May 26, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/news/
economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
71.
Larry Elliott Washington & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks
or Risk Crisis, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 8, 2010, at 25 (paraphrasing an
announcement by the IMF’s then-managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn).
Previously, the G-20 leaders had requested that the IMF prepare a report, detailing
“how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying
for any burden associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.”
INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20, at 4 (2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf.
72.
The European Commission has recognized this in connection with its
proposal to impose a tax on the financial sector. Cf. Memorandum from Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft LLP on Proposals for a European Union Financial Transactions
Tax 10 (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/
102511_-_EU_FTT.pdf (noting that unless all key financial jurisdictions are included in
a financial transaction tax, investors will be tempted to relocate their financial
transactions away from the EU).
73.
This was first proposed in Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 225–30.
74.
See TOBIAS ADRIAN, KARIN KIMBROUGH & DINA MARCHIONI, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 423, THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S COMMERCIAL
PAPER FUNDING FACILITY (2010), available at http:www.newyorkfed.org/research/
staff_reports/sr423.pdf.
75.
Id. at 27 (“The CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial
paper market . . . .”).
76.
The U.S. Federal Reserve, for example, has been engaging in quantitative
easing programs, purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term
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market liquidity provider of last resort would be more targeted: to
stabilize panicked financial markets that are systematically important,
thereby mitigating the systemic impact of a market collapse.77
To illustrate how this approach can be applied more broadly,
consider the following example. The intrinsic value—effectively the
present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a
type of mortgage-backed security is estimated to be in the range of
eighty cents on the dollar. If, due to panic, the market price of those
securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to twenty
cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase these
securities at, say, sixty cents on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the
market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the mortgagebacked securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider
could, for example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price” if
the securities turn out to be worth more than expected.78 This is just one
(simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in
structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain
value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s
purchases.79

interest rates. See Annalyn Censky, QE2: Fed Pulls the Trigger, CNNMONEY (Nov. 3,
2010, 4:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/11/03/news/economy/fed_decision/
index.htm.
77.
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest
at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors would
not also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market
liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will not want to
jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when
other investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors
usually want to buy and sell securities, without having to wait for their maturities,
whereas a market liquidity provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity,
if necessary.
78.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety
Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
94, 99 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (using this
example).
79.
“Alternatively, a market liquidity provider [of last resort] could attempt to
stabilize the market by entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the
market has the greatest difficulty hedging—in effect, the market’s irrationality
element—thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging—and not actually
purchasing securities directly—the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking
less investment risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable.”
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2. REQUIRING FIRMS AND MARKETS TO BE MORE INTERNALLY ROBUST
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms
and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust.80 This
could be accomplished in various ways. First consider firms.
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires banks and, to the
extent designated as “systemically important,” other financial firms to
be subject to a range of capital and similar requirements.81 Addressing
the possibility that a firm could nevertheless end up failing, the Act also
requires these firms to submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living
will”—that sets forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly
manner to minimize further systemic impact.82
The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and their
potential impact on efficiency, are open questions. Reducing a firm’s
leverage, for example, can certainly enable the firm to withstand
economic shocks and reduce its chance of failure.83 The Basel capital
requirements, however, did not prevent the many bank failures
resulting from the 2008 financial crisis. Setting regulatory limits on
leverage could also backfire, because some leverage is good but there is
no optimal across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every
firm.84 Regulation should at least focus, however, on attempting to
80.
Although I refer to regulation requiring firms to become more internally
robust as ex post (in the sense that more robust firms can better withstand a systemic
shock), such regulation could also be viewed as ex ante in the sense that robust firms
are less likely to fail and thereby trigger a systemic shock. I am still pondering the
appropriate ex-ante/ex-post distinction.
81.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 115(b), 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1403–04, 1430 (2010). The DoddFrank Act directs the Federal Reserve, for example, to set “prudential” capital
standards for certain large financial firms, including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of
15:1. § 165(j).
82.
§ 165(d).
83.
Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing highly leveraged firms
engaging in fire-sales of assets).
84.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 224. The Basel Committee has introduced a
binding three percent leverage ratio that will take effect in 2018 and will require banks
to hold three percent of Tier 1 capital, which is primarily comprised of common equity.
The leverage ratio will prevent banks from accumulating assets worth more than thirtythree times their Tier 1 capital. Members of the Basel Committee have argued that a
binding leverage ratio is critical since “risk-based ratios alone are vulnerable to
gaming.” Hervé Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Introductory Remarks at the International Association of Deposit Insurers 2011
Research Conference: Financial Crises: The Role of Deposit Insurance 3 (June 8,
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110609.pdf (highlighting the
importance of the Basel III commitment to move toward a binding leverage ratio). Of
course, national regulators will have to implement such international requirements on a
domestic level before they take effect, and the idea has prompted considerable criticism
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prevent firms from opportunistically overleveraging themselves during
boom times, thereby correcting that type of cyclical imbalance.85
One also might question Dodd-Frank’s living-will requirement. Ex
ante plans (such as a liquidation plan made when a financial firm is
healthy) rarely match ex post realities (such as the realities facing the
firm when financially challenged). Moreover, it is uncertain whether
future politicians would, or should, force the liquidation of a large
financial firm, even pursuant to its living will, without considering the
consequences at that time.
The Dodd-Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a
systemically important firm’s right to make risky investments—often
referred to as the Volcker Rule.86 This is a highly paternalistic
approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s
own business judgment.87 One should be generally skeptical of any rule
that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial firm from itself 88—and
from European leaders. Jim Brunsden, Banks in Europe May Win EU Exemption from
Leverage Ratio, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:45 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/banks-in-europe-said-to-be-poised-toescape-basel-rules-that-curtail-debt.html (stating that a majority of EU members oppose
the new Basel leverage ratio and may seek an exemption from it); Jim Brunsden &
Meera Louis, Germany, France Said to Fight Basel Bank-Leverage Disclosure,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-03-11/germany-france-said-to-fight-basel-rules-forcing-banks-to-revealleverage.html (noting that France and Germany are “fiercely against” Basel proposals
for lenders to reveal as soon as 2015 whether they would meet the leverage ratio).
85.
The Basel Committee has attempted to address overleveraging in part by
introducing a counter-cyclical capital requirement of up to 2.5% of common equity or
other loss-absorbing capital (above the new Basel III regulatory minimum) that national
regulators can impose when they suspect the emergence of credit bubbles. The buffer
can be drawn down in periods of financial stress. Press Release, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global
Minimum Capital Standards 2 (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/press/
p100912.pdf.
86.
See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 619, § 13 (codifying steps to implement the
Volcker Rule limiting proprietary trading). Several federal agencies—the Federal
Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency—recently proposed rules to implement this. Prohibitions
and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships
with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (proposed Nov. 7,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 255), available at
http://fdic.gov/news/board/2011Octno6.pdf.
87.
The Volcker Rule might be considered, conceptually, as a subset of ringfencing. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. Ring-fencing, however, could
impose regulation that goes beyond investment limitations, potentially restricting other
business decisions of banks and systemically important firms.
88.
I recognize that even sophisticated financial firms sometimes might not
fully understand a highly complex investment. Cf. supra note 21 and accompanying text
(discussing misinformation). The ultimate question of the value of the Volcker Rule will
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indeed, Moody’s has warned that a leaked early draft of interagency
rules implementing the Volcker Rule would, if adopted, probably
“‘diminish the flexibility and profitability of banks’ valuable marketmaking operations and place them at a competitive disadvantage to
firms not constrained by the rule.’”89
Dodd-Frank appropriately does require many large public firms to
institute internal governance procedures to protect the firm, including
establishing risk committees (with at least one risk-management expert)
responsible for enterprise-wide risk-management oversight.90 Well
managed firms should—and in my experience already do—have these
types of procedures and committees.
Also appropriately, the Dodd-Frank Act does not attempt to
artificially limit the size of financial firms. Some have argued that size
limits would minimize the potential moral hazard from firms that
believe they are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence
of such risky behavior, and financial firm losses can be explained by
other reasons. Size should be governed by the economies of scale and
scope needed for firms to successfully compete, domestically and
abroad—so long as that size is manageable.
We should be cautious, however, of financial firms that increase
their size, especially by acquisition of other firms, primarily to satisfy
senior management egos.91 Dodd-Frank indirectly addresses this
concern (at least weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to
long-term results—for example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt
standards whereby listed companies implement policies to recoup senior
executive compensation in the event of an accounting restatement.92
Another way that regulation could make systemically important
firms more internally robust is by requiring at least some portion of
their debt to be in the form of so-called contingent capital.93 Contingent
therefore be empirical: whether the benefits of its limitation on proprietary trading will
outweigh profits lost by losing the ability to engage in such trading. Although some
may argue that those benefits, which accrue to all, should be more highly weighted than
profits, which accrue only to the financial firms themselves, my proposal for a
privatized systemic risk fund should help to internalize any harm of proprietary trading.
See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
89.
Edward Wyatt, Regulators to Set Forth Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2011, at B1 (quoting Moody’s).
90.
Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h).
91.
I thank my colleague, Lawrence Baxter—a banking law professor, turned
senior bank executive, and recently returned to the academy—for this observation.
92.
Sec. 954, § 10D.
93.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank:
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011). Coffee’s proposal for “bail in” contingent capital
conversion calls for conversion on a gradual, incremental basis. Debt would convert to

2012:815

Controlling Financial Chaos

837

capital debt would automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence
of pre-agreed events. Requiring contingent capital is therefore
effectively like requiring a pre-planned debt restructuring or workout.
It is unclear if regulatory-imposed contingent capital would be
efficient.94 If contingent capital is a good idea, markets themselves
should implement it; but there is no evidence of that implementation
(nor is there evidence of market failures impeding that implementation).
One should also be skeptical whether regulatory-imposed contingent
capital might have unforeseen consequences. For example, automatic
conversions of debt claims to equity interests might create counterparty
risk by reducing the value of firms holding those claims.95
Finally, regulation could focus on making systemically important
firms more internally robust at least to the extent such firms provide
public goods. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act
(which has since been revoked) had created a separation between
commercial and investment banking—the former including deposit
taking and lending, the latter including securities underwriting and
investing. Although the Dodd-Frank Act does not reinstitute this
separation, the final report of the U.K. Independent Commission on
Banking (often called the Vickers Report)96 recommends a more limited
form of separation, which it calls ring-fencing, intended to protect the
“basic banking services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure
payments systems, efficiently channelling savings to productive

a senior, nonconvertible preferred stock with cumulative dividends and voting rights.
This structure would allow for the dilution of equity to deter excessive risk taking, the
creation of a class of risk-averse preferred shareholders to counteract the risk-favoring
tendencies of common shareholders, and the avoidance of an “all-or-nothing”
transition. Id. at 795–96.
94.
As of July 2011, the Basel Committee has determined that systemically
important financial firms will only be allowed to meet their additional loss absorbency
requirement with common equity Tier 1 capital, not contingent capital. The Basel
Committee will, however, “continue to review contingent capital, and support the use
of contingent capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the
global requirement, as high-trigger contingent capital could help absorb losses on a
going concern basis.” BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS
ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 19–20 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs201.pdf.
95.
The conversion would constitute an actual reduction in value if the preagreed trigger is sensible.
96.
Although I provided input for this report in a November 12, 2010 meeting
at All Souls College, University of Oxford, with Commission Chairman Sir John
Vickers and other members of the Commission’s Secretariat, I did not suggest the ringfencing procedure that the report eventually adopted.
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investments [i.e., making loans], and managing financial risk.”97 The
ring-fencing proposed in the Vickers Report appears to have similarities
to ring-fencing used in the United States to protect essential public
utilities, which often operate as subsidiaries within holding-company
structures.98
Ring-fencing is more of a micro- than macro-prudential approach
since its focus is more on protecting retail banking activities rather than
on preventing systemic collapse.99 Nonetheless, to the extent it
improves consumer confidence, ring-fencing of retail banking might be
beneficial to the real economy.100

D. Summary
Regulation could protect the financial system in at least three
ways: by limiting the triggers of systemic risk, by limiting the
97.
INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011)
[hereinafter VICKERS REPORT].
98.
In expert testimony to a state public service commission, I have recently
defined utility ring-fencing as follows:
The term ring-fencing is not always clearly defined. By “ring-fencing,” I
mean protection of [the utility subsidiary] and its assets from harm caused
by the [utility subsidiary’s] affiliates. A primary goal of ring-fencing is
protecting the [utility subsidiary] from harm caused by a possible
bankruptcy of one or more of its affiliates. This is achieved by making it
unlikely that an affiliate’s bankruptcy will involuntarily force the [utility
subsidiary] into bankruptcy or cause a substantive consolidation of the
affiliate and the [utility subsidiary] or cause the [utility subsidiary] to
voluntarily file for bankruptcy. Another goal of ring-fencing is protecting
the [utility subsidiary’s] assets from being raided by an affiliate. This can be
achieved by imposing dividend restrictions on the [utility subsidiary] and by
restricting non-arm’s length transactions that are unfair to the [utility
subsidiary].
Rebuttal Testimony of Steven L. Schwarcz at 3–4, In re Matter of the Merger of
Exelon Corp. & Constellation Energy Grp., Inc., (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. 2011)
(No. 9271) (on file with the author). The Vickers Report similarly proposes that the
“banks’ UK retail activities . . . be carried out in separate subsidiaries. The UK retail
subsidiaries would be legally, economically and operationally separate from the rest of
the banking groups to which they belonged.” VICKERS REPORT, supra note 97, at 11.
99.
Cf. Laurence Kotlikoff, Why the Vickers Report Failed the UK and the
World, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2011/09/
why-the-vickers-report-failed-the-uk-and-the-world/ (observing, among other things,
that the flaw of “ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their thing” is
demonstrated by “the collapse of Lehman Brothers [which Prof. Kotlikoff likens to a
bad bank], whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system”).
100. In addition to helping to stabilize firms, regulation could help to stabilize
systemically important markets, such as by requiring appropriate circuit breakers. See,
e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 1398–1401 (discussing market circuit
breakers).
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transmission of systemic shocks, and by attempting to stabilize the
system. Eliminating the triggers of systemic risk is not feasible.
Eliminating the transmission of systemic shocks is likewise not feasible.
It therefore is critical to try to stabilize the financial system against
the consequences of systemic shocks. This will involve stabilizing both
systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the
shocks. This Essay has examined two approaches to stabilization:
ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets, and requiring those firms
and markets to be more internally robust.
The first approach—ensuring liquidity—would help to stabilize
firms and markets. It also would help to control the motivation of
systemically important firms to externalize their costs. If the source of
the liquidity could be privatized, public costs would be even further
reduced. The extent to which regulation can efficiently require
systemically important firms and markets to be more internally robust
is, however, a more open question.
CONCLUSION
This Essay examines how the law can help to control financial
chaos. To that end, regulation should strive not only to maximize
economic efficiency within the financial system but also to protect the
financial system itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these
goals, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs.
Market failures that impair efficiency are not always susceptible to
legal solutions. For example, increasing financial complexity has
created information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy,
whereas law-imposed standardization would have its own flaws.
Bounded human rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise
ideal laws. And the increasing dispersion of financial risk is
undermining monitoring incentives.
One type of market failure—principal-agent failure—is
theoretically susceptible to legal solutions. To the extent financial firms
do not change their compensation schemes, regulation could require
them to pay managers, critically including secondary managers, under
longer-term compensation arrangements. But because financial
managers can work in money centers worldwide, this type of regulation
ideally should be global to avoid prejudicing the competitiveness of
firms subject to particular national rules.
Regulation should also strive to protect the financial system itself.
Because we do not yet know enough about how systemic risk is
triggered and spread, this type of regulation should operate primarily to
help reduce systemic consequences by stabilizing parts of the financial
system afflicted by systemic shocks. That could be done in two ways:
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by ensuring liquidity to systemically important firms and markets, and
by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally robust.
The extent to which regulation could efficiently require
systemically important firms and markets to be more internally robust is
unclear. Ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets could increase
stability, however, especially if the liquidity sources are required (at
least partly) to be privatized. That not only would help to internalize
externalities but also would motivate systemically important firms to
monitor each other and help control each other’s risky behavior. Again,
this type of regulation ideally should be global to avoid prejudicing the
competitiveness of firms subject to particular national regulatory
requirements.

